90-329

UMC SCREET

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT Paris, May 1960

Contingency Position Paper



Bilateral Discussions of President and Chancellor Adenauer

1. Summit Discussion of Germany and Berlin (the President may wish to raise)

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might state that he is satisfied, after reviewing the preparatory work for the Summit, that the Western Heads of Government are reasonably well prepared for discussing the question of Germany including Berlin with Khrushchev. He might note that the solidarity of the Western alliance on the question is exemplified by the May 3 NAC communique. With respect to the question of Germany in its larger aspects, he might comment that the proposal for an all-German plebiscite strikes him as an effective way of emphasizing the basic issue of self-determination. With respect to Berlin, he might observe that there is little reason to expect any real agreement at the Summit but that he hopes the edge can be taken off the crisis by deterring unilateral Soviet action and possibly smoothing the way for further discussions. The President might remind the Chancellor that, since the treatment of Germany including Berlin at the Summit will be essentially a tactical problem, the Western Powers must maintain a certain amount of negotiating flexibility. At the same time, he might reassure the Chancellor that the determination of the United States to continue to press for German reunification and to maintain the freedom and security of West Berlin in the interim remains as firm as ever.

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor will probably regard his meeting with the President as an opportunity for an eleventh-hour admonition about the importance of maintaining a firm

DECLASSIFIED		
Authority M. 90-329-4		
By 462 NLE DA 7/10/91		

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	Western	position
The chancel (last) 'y to		•
With concurrence of Declarative In part and excise as shown	n	
80 12368, Sec. 1.3 (a)	•	



Western position on Germany and Berlin. He may express some uneasiness about the possibility of Prime Minister Macmillan's diverging from the Western position as developed by the Four Power Working Group and the Foreign Ministers. The Chancellor would undoubtedly be reassured if the President commented along the lines of the recommended U.S. position above.

Discussion

See "U. S. Position on Working Group Report on Germany Including Berlin" (SMP D-2/1).

2. Norstad Plan (the Chancellor might raise)

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor may express strong objections, on political grounds, to a European inspection zone of the type proposed by General Norstad and express the hope that the proposal may be regarded as dead.

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might reply that he recognizes some of the Allies have strong political objections to the proposal. Although he considers that the plan could have military advantages, he understands the political objections and is not suggesting agreement on a proposal of this nature for possible use at the Summit.

Discussion

See separate position paper "Norstad Plan" (SMP D-1/2).

3. Intelligence Flight over Soviet Union (the Chancellor may raise)
Anticipated German Position

It is possible that the Chancellor may allude to the shooting down of the U.S. plane on an intelligence mission over the Soviet Union and express his understanding of the reasons why such flights are regarded as necessary.

Recommended U. S. Position

It is doubtful that the President would have to do more than take note of the Chancellor's comments.

SECRET

لفتو ودي

SECRET



4. Plight of Evangelical Church in Soviet Zone (the Chancellor may raise)

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor may refer to the difficult situation of the Evangelical Church in the Soviet Zone and mention in particular the likelihood of new efforts by the Communist regime to put financial pressures on the Church.

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might reply that he agrees that such a development would be serious, for he regards the Evangelical Church as one of the most important remaining bonds between the people of West and East Germany. He might add that we will inform the appropriate American officials about the Chancellor's comments and ask them to consider what assistance they might be able to give.

Drafted by: GPA - Mr. McKiernan Cleared by:

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand

EUR - Mr. Davis C - Mr. Achilles M - Mr. Merchant

SECRETE WELL